Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Jaakko Hintikka on Ontology - Dictionary of Arguments

II 40
Ontology/existence/non-existence/Hintikka: if we allow the range of our quantifiers to be extended for non-existent objects, the most urgent question is:
Where are these non-existent objects?
E.g. "everyone's lover", e.g. "no one's lover".
Both are obviously possible but unlike Meinong's round square.
, >Round square, >Logical possibility.
E.g. "the envy of all", e.g. "which is envied by everyone".
N.B.: both are incompatible. The former must love the latter, but the latter cannot be loved by the first.
Everyone/all/nobody/Hintikka: it is no solution here to claim that "everyone" or "nobody" only goes via existent objects ((s) that is, we must allow non-existent or possible objects (>possibilia)).
Meinong/Hintikka: Meinong gained the power of his arguments from the fact that we have to allow non-existent objects here. (Also >Terence Parsons).
Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world.
>Possible worlds.
II 88
Ontology/thing/subject/object/Hintikka: the ontology of most philosophers is upside down. This is because they seek independent objects as building blocks.
II 89
HintikkaVsTradition: solid objects are not the building blocks of our world. Instead, we are dealing with mass points which result in the objects as solutions of differential equations.
Cf. >Four-dimensionalism, >Space-time.
Geometry/Hintikka: for the same reason, geometry is more fundamental than quantum theory.
Space/time/Kant/Hintikka: Kant, therefore, is right because of another reason, as our analysis shows: space and time are fundamental because the objects are formed in them. ((s) Because of the sometimes not closed curves, something is not an object in a possible world (here = time segment), but in another one).
Space/time/Hintikka: the conceptual precedence of space and time also has other consequences: it shows that the expression "possible world" is inappropriate:
II 90
Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the expression "possible worlds" presupposes that space-time is divided.
II 90
Object/thing/identification/identity/individuation/space time/Hintikka: space time is still just a means of identification.
What determines the result of the identification is the triple of the functions f, g, h.
This function specifies the totality of the motions of the mass points in our model. They are the hard core of identification and individuation.
Matter/Hintikka: identification and individuation are based on material reality.
>Identification, >Individuation.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

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