Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Judgments: A judgment differs from a statement in that it also asserts the truth of its content. In logic, this is expressed with a graphical emphasis, the judgment stroke. See also Truth, Statements, Assertions.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Hans-Georg Gadamer on Judgments - Dictionary of Arguments

Gadamer I 36
Judgment/"Urteilskraft"/Humanities/Gadamer: The "common sense" ["Gesunder Menschenverstand"] (...) is (...) decisively characterized by judgement.
>Sensus communis
, >Common sense.
The introduction of the word in the 18th century thus wants to adequately reflect the concept of iudicium, which has to be considered a basic spiritual virtue.
Sensus communis: In the same sense, English moral philosophers stress that moral and aesthetic judgements do not obey reason but have the character of sentiment (or taste), and similarly Tetens, one of the representatives of the German Enlightenment, sees in sensus communis an "iudicium without reflection"(1).
Judgement: In fact, the activity of judgement is to subsume a particular under a general, to recognize something as the case of a rule; this is logically not demonstrable. Judgment is therefore in a fundamental embarrassment because of a principle which could guide its application. It would itself require a different power of judgement for the observance of this principle, as Kant astutely observes(2). It cannot therefore be taught in general, but only practised on a case-by-case basis, and in this respect it is more a skill as the senses are. It is something quite simply unlearnable, because no demonstration of concepts can guide the application of rules.
Cf. >Rule following.
Enlightenment: Consequently, the German philosophy of the Enlightenment did not attribute the power of judgement to the higher faculty of the mind, but to the lower faculty of knowledge. It has thus taken a direction that departs far from the original Roman sense of sensus communis and continues the scholastic tradition. This was to take on a special significance for aesthetics.
I 37
Urteilskraft/GadamerVsKant/Gadamer: The generality ascribed to judgement is nothing as " vulgar ["gemein"] " as Kant sees it. Judgement is not at all so
very much a skill than a demand to be placed on everyone. All have enough "common sense," that is, judgment, to be able to expect of them the proof of a "common sense" of genuine moral and civic solidarity, but that is to say, judgment of right and wrong and concern for the "common good". This is what makes Vico's appeal to the humanistic tradition so impressive that, in contrast to the logics of the concept of public spirit, he captures the whole content of what was alive in the Roman tradition of this word (...).
Shaftesbury/Gadamer: Likewise, Shaftesbury's taking up this
I 38
concept, as we saw (>Sensus communis/Shaftesbury), at the same time a link to the political and social tradition of humanism. The sensus communis is a moment of bourgeois-moral being. Even where this term, as in Pietism or in the philosophy of the Scots (>Th. Reid), means a polemical turn against metaphysics, it still remains in the line of its original critical function. In contrast, Kant's adoption of this term is accentuated quite differently in the "Critique of Judgment"(3).

1. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung,
Leipzig 1777, 1, 520.
2. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft 1799, S. Vll.
3. Kritik der Urteilskraft, S 40.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

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