Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Holism: Holism is the assumption that the elements or the subject domain of a theory are accessible only with simultaneous availability of all elements or objects of this domain. It is also assumed that a change to an element does not exclude changes to all other elements at least. The statement "everything is connected with everything" is however a wrong characterization of the holism, since it is logically erroneous.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Michael Devitt on Holism - Dictionary of Arguments

Fodor I 131
Holism/Devitt: irreducible functional and therefore perhaps holistic concepts are common in nonintentional sciences.
Question/Devitt: why should psychologists be concerned when belief turns out to be holistic?
Fodor/Lepore: Answer: one can have a functionalism of X without having a definition of X! For example, one can have a metaphysical doctrine about the supervenience base of X.
>Reduction
, >Irreducibility, >Intentionality, >Psychology,
>Beliefs, >Semantic Holism, >Functionalism, >Metaphysics,
>Supervenience.

_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Devi I
M. Devitt
Realism and Truth Princeton 1996

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Send Link

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z