Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Simulation, philosophy: a simulation is the establishment of a correspondence to a process, a procedure or a situation with means which are different from those involved in the original process or the original situation. The simulation itself is either the subject of an investigation, or it serves the purpose of creating an illusion for exercise or entertainment purposes. See also copy, reproduction, reality, similarity, forgery, figure, process, situation, models.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David Chalmers on Simulation - Dictionary of Arguments

I 327
Simulation/Artificial Intelligence/Consciousness/Searle/Chalmers: SearleVsArtificial Intelligence (Searle 1980)(1), HarnadVsArtificial Intelligence (Harnad 1989)(2): Thesis: the simulation of a phenomenon is not the same as a replica of the phenomenon. E.g. the digital simulation of the digestion process does not digest any food.
>Artificial Intelligence
, >Strong Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial Consciousness, >Simulation.
I 328
Simulation/Chalmers: while some simulations are not real doublings, e.g. the simulation of heat, others are real doublings: e.g. the simulation of a system with a causal loop is a system with a causal loop.
Definition Simulation/Chalmers: a simulation of X is an X if the property of being X is an organizational invariance. That is, if the system depends only on the functional organization of the underlying system and nothing else. The remaining properties are not retained. For example, the property of being a hurricane is not organisationally invariant because it is partly dependent on non-organizational properties such as speed, shape, etc. Likewise, heat or digestion depend on aspects of the physical nature and are not entirely organisational.
Consciousness/Simulation/Chalmers: phenomenal properties are different: they are organisationally invariant; i.e. in case of an identical physical structure, two systems will have the same phenomenal experiences. Thus, consciousness becomes one of the other different property.
>Consciousness, >Consciousness/Chalmers.

1. J. R. Searle, Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 417 -24
2. S. Harnad, Minds, machines, and Searle. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1, 1989: pp.5-25.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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