Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Laws: A. Laws are rules created and enforced by governments to regulate behavior, protect people's rights, and promote order and justice in society. - B. Laws of nature are fundamental principles that describe how the universe works. They are universal and unchanging. - C. The status of laws in the individual sciences is controversial, since they may only describe regularities. See also Natural laws, Regularities, Principles._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Chalmers on Laws - Dictionary of Arguments
I 86 Physical Laws/Causes/Supervenience/Reduction/Chalmers: Natural laws are not logically supervenient on the physical facts of our world with their spatio-temporal history. There could be another world, indistinguishable from our world, on which other physical laws apply. >Laws of nature, >Possible worlds, >Indistinguishability, >Twin earth, >Supervenience, cf. >Determinism. Regularity/Chalmers: on such arguments one can see that causality must be a bit above and independent of regularities (Hume's view of laws and causation: see Lewis 1986b(1), Mackie 1974(2), Skyrms 1980(3). VsHueme's view: Armstrong 1982(4), Carroll 1994(5), Dretske 1977(6), Molnar 1969(7), Tooley 1977)(8) .. Laws and causality have something irreducible. I 213/214 Laws/Consciousness/Chalmers: we will need psychophysical laws to explain consciousness together with a underlying physical structure. I 216 Data: we have at least data about regularities between physical processes and conscious experiences, from which we can conclude the best explanation. First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc. >Regularities. I 308 Laws/psychophysical laws/Chalmers: some questions need to be answered: 1. If the information space is phenomenologically realized, then why in one way and not in another? E.g. With inverted Qualia? >Qualia/Chalmers, >Exchanged spectra. 2. Is the nature of the phenomenal information defined by the structure of space? I 309 How can complex emotional experiences be explained? >Explanation/Chalmers. 4. What kind of formal structure best captures the structure of phenomenal information? >Phenomena, >Experience. 5. How can the unity of consciousness within our framework be captured? >Consciousness/Chalmers. 6. What are the criteria according to which information in my brain corresponds to my conscious experiences? 1. D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers Vol II, New York 1986 2. J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe, Oxford 1974 3. B. Skyrms Causal Necessity, New Haven 1980 4. D. M. Armstrong, Metaphysics and supervenience, Critica 42, 1982: pp. 3-17 5. J. W. Caroll, Laws of Nature, Cambridge 1994 6. F. Dretske, Laws of Nature, Philosophy of Science 44, 1977: pp. 248-68 7. G. Molnar, Kneale's argument revisited. Oghilosophical Review 78, 1969: pp. 79-89 8. M. Tooley, The Nature of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 1977: pp. 667-98_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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