Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Circumstances, philosophy: the concept of circumstances is relevant in the context of observations which are intended to confirm or disprove a hypothesis within an assumed theory. What belongs to the relevant circumstances is determined by the theory. See also situations, states, conditions, theories, ceteris paribus, experiments, observation, theoretical terms, theoretical entities, relevance, significance.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Stanley Cavell on Circumstances - Dictionary of Arguments

II 187
Circumstances/Cavell: before we know whether our examples are a priori, we must justify our (or my) extraordinary confidence in the context.
>Context
, >Situation, >Intention, >Intentionality, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention.
This is not only the linguistic context, but desires, intentions, beliefs, etc., but one does not have to go into an infinite investigation here.

_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Cavell I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

Cavell I (a)
Stanley Cavell
"Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (b)
Stanley Cavell
"Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (c)
Stanley Cavell
"The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell II
Stanley Cavell
"Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958)
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Cavell
> Counter arguments in relation to Circumstances

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z