Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Norms, ethics, philosophy: norms define which actions are permitted, advisable or prohibited when certain circumstances are present. The philosophical discussion deals mainly with questions of its justification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Stanley Cavell on Norms - Dictionary of Arguments
II 192 Norms/Normative/Normativity/Cavell: Normativity is not in the assertions of the philosopher of the everyday language. >Everyday language, >Meaning/Intending/Cavell. II 193 Traditional problems with the concept of normativity stem from the following confusions: 1. the (wrong) idea, descriptive utterances are the opposite of normative utterances. 2. prescriptive utterances are typical examples of normative utterances. >Descriptive/prescriptive. Ad 1. typical of actions is that they can go wrong. But then descriptive statements do not represent the opposite of normative statements, but rather presuppose them. We could not do what we call describing, if the language did not comprehend us with consummation forms that are normative for describing. Ad. 2. If normative expressions are used to institutionalize rules, then prescriptive utterances are not examples of normative utterances. II 194 Formulating a norm does not mean to indicate how we should perform an action, but how the action is done! Specifying what we should do is not to institutionalize a norm, but rather presupposes the existence of a norm! Language/Norms/Cavell: We sometimes invoke standards which our interlocutor does not accept, but we do not try to institutionalize our own norms, nor to express our subjective views. >Convention. II 195 There are always different normative possibilities to fulfill the particular normative tasks._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
||
