|Individuation, philosophy: the picking out of an object by a determination by means of additional information which is not to be derived from a single statement which contains this object. For example, beliefs are individualized by content, not e.g. by the length of the character strings with which they are expressed. The contents of a belief are, in turn, not individuated by their repetition, but by other contents._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Franz Brentano on Individuation - Dictionary of Arguments
Chisholm I 34
Individuation/I/Self/Idea/I/Intention/Brentano: in the self-evident mental states presented by us, we never capture any individualizing properties.
All my properties, which I can readily grasp, are such that they can at least be theoretically immediately exemplified in different things. (BrentanoVsDescartes). >Self-identification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004