Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Consciousness, philosophy: consciousness ist the experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also Intentionality, Identity theory, Other minds, Self-consciousness.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Franz Brentano on Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments

Chisholm I 130
Unity of Consciousness/Brentano(1): if a person imagines something, or at the same time imagines several objects, he also recognizes at the same time the simultaneity of both. For example, if one hears a melody, he hears the one tone as present while he perceives the other as past. ... in which of the experiences is the idea of their simultaneity? In none! >Imagination
.
On the contrary, it is clear that the inner cognition of the one with the other belongs to the same real unity.
I 131
Consciousness/Chisholm/Unity/Brentano/Chisholm: suggests the following principle: if it is certain for x that it is F and also that it is G, then it is also certain that it is F and G. Cf. >Perception/Kant.
This seems unquestionable on the basis of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception.
ChisholmVs: it seems to be too strict, however.
Kant: the subject, does not need to unite the ideas, it only needs to appear that it could.
If it is true for x that it is F, and also that it is G, and it is considering the question whether it is both F and G, then it is certain for it.
I 132
This also applies to proposed premises.


1. F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Hamburg, 1973, p. 227f
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Chisholm II 269
Consciousness/Brentano/Hedwig: Brentano has never admitted the psychological abyss of consciousness, but always insisted on the uniqueness of thinking.


Chisholm II =
Klaus Hedwig Brentano und Kopernikus in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Ed.), Amsterdam 1986

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Brent I
F. Brentano
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992


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