Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefore, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
G. E. M. Anscombe on Intensions - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 96 I/Intension/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here the "way of givenness" is unimportant. 97 The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.". His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as subject, then they true and then if the predicates of x are true. AnscombeVsLogicAnscombeVsKripke: for this reason, he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes". But this is too superficial: if you are a speaker who says "I", you cannot find out what it is that says "I". For example, we do not look from which device the sound comes. Thus, we must require our logicians to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I". I 98 Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no difference between "I" and "A" (see Logic/Anscombe)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank, Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
||
> Counter arguments against Anscombe
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensions
