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Speculative philosophy: Speculative philosophy, as understood by Hegel, is a mode of thought that seeks to grasp the inner nature of reality as a whole. It does this by examining the concepts and categories that we use to understand the world and showing how they are interconnected. See also Dialectic, Philosophy, Concepts, Categories, Method, Hermeneutics, Understanding, Reality, Wholes.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

G.W.F. Hegel on Speculative Philosophy - Dictionary of Arguments

Gadamer I 470
Speculation/Hegel/Gadamer: Hegel has described the speculative relationship of thought in his masterful analysis of the logic of the philosophical proposition(1). He shows that the philosophical proposition is a judgement only in its external form, i.e. it attaches a predicate to a concept of subject.
: speculation instead of predication.
>Predication, >Attribution.
In truth, the philosophical proposition does not pass from the concept of subject to another concept that is related to it, but it pronounces the truth of the subject in the form of the predicate.
For example, "God is One" does not mean that it is an attribute of God to be One, but that it is the essence of God to be unity.
Cf. >Numbers/Frege.
Hegel/Gadamer: The movement of determining is here not tied to the fixed base of the subject, "at which it runs to and fro". The subject is not determined as this and also as that, in one respect this way and in another respect differently. That would be the way of imagining thought, not the way of concept.
Understanding Thinking/Hegel: in understanding thinking, rather, the natural reaching out of determining beyond the subject of the proposition is inhibited and "suffers, to imagine it thus, a counterattack. Starting from the subject, as if it were at the bottom, it finds, in that the predicate is rather the substance, the subject has passed over to the predicate and thus abolished it. And by thus making what appears to be predicate a whole and independent mass, thinking can
Gadamer I 471
not wander around freely, but is held back by this heaviness"(2).
Gadamer: The form of the proposition thus destroys itself, in that the speculative proposition does not say anything about something, but rather brings the unity of the concept to the point of representation.
Hegel describes the floating bipedality of the philosophical proposition, which is created by the counter-attack, by the witty comparison with the rhythm, which similarly results from the two moments of the metre and the accent as their floating harmony.
Cf. >Hearing/Gadamer.
Concept/Evidence/Hegel/Gadamer: According to Hegel, however, it is now a matter of bringing the inner inhibition, that thinking experiences when its habit of running away from ideas is interrupted by the concept, to an explicit representation. Non-speculative thinking can demand this, as it were. It has its "right, which is valid, but not observed in the manner of the speculative proposition". What it can demand is that the dialectical self-destruction of the proposition is to be pronounced. (...) in any case, it wants to restore the sense of philosophical proof. This happens in the representation of the dialectical movement of the proposition. It is the real speculative, and only the utterance of it is speculative representation.
Philosophy/Hegel: The speculative relationship must therefore change into dialectical representation. According to Hegel, this is the demand of philosophy.
Proof/Hegel/Gadamer: What is called expression and representation here is of course not actually a proving action, but the thing itself
Gadamer I 472
proves itself by expressing and representing itself in this way. Thus dialectic will also really experience that thinking is turned into its opposite as an incomprehensible reversal. It is precisely the adherence to the consistency of thought that leads to the surprising movement of the envelope. Thus, for example, the person seeking justice experiences how the strict adherence to the thought of law becomes "abstract" and proves to be the highest injustice (summum ius summa iniuria).

1. Cf. for this Gadamer, „Hegels Dialektik. Sechs hermeneutische Studien“ Tübingen 1980,
vol. 3 of Ges. Werke.)
2. Hegel, Vorrede zur Pänomenologie, p. 50 (Hoffmeister).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

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