Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Attribution: statements that provide an object with properties are attributions. See also self-ascription, predication._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Christopher Peacocke on Attribution - Dictionary of Arguments
Avramides I 92 Beliefs/Desires/Attributions/Radical Interpretation/Peacocke/Avramidis: Suppose we could attribute beliefs and desires before the knowledge of the language. In this case, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes would still be necessary. >Propositional attitudes, >Thinking without language, >Desires, >Beliefs. But not particular propositional attitudes before language. >Language, >Understanding, >Language use. PeacockeVs "actual language relation": this supposedly needs no semantic vocabulary. >Reference, cf. >Primitive reference, >Semantics. Peacocke later: Gricean intentions cannot be used as evidence for radical interpretation, but that's not VsGrice. >Intentions/Grice, >P. Grice. - - - Peacocke I 78f Propositional Attitudes/Attribution/Peacocke: Problem: instead of one set of propositional attitudes another can also be attributed. Solution/Peacocke: Relation of Closeness/Narrowness. E.g. someone who rearranges something on the table usually does not respond to the compass direction. - The concepts may then have different expressiveness. Important point: if it is a rotating table, the space-relative concepts can change while the table-relative ones remain constant. ((s) The concepts do not change, but their truth values.) More expressive: the space-relative concepts. - Problem: if they are used here, there may be an explanatory gap. >narrow concepts. I 83 We should not attribute any wider concepts if there more narrow ones are available. >Narrow/wide._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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> Counter arguments against Peacocke
> Counter arguments in relation to Attribution
