Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Knowledge: Knowledge is the awareness or understanding of something. It can be acquired through experience, or education. Knowledge can be factual, procedural, or conceptual. See also Propositional knowledge, Knowledge how._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Nozick on Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments
II 185 Knowledge/Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./Nozick: E.g. I know that a pair of scissors is now in my drawer. - But it is not correct to say that if there is one there, that I would know then. ((s) So something can be true, even if the counterfactual conditional is false - namely, because the method can be crucial). >Method/Nozick, >Counterfactual conditional. ((s) So the counterfactual conditional must mention the method.) II 189 Gettier/Nozick: Gettier - examples conclude a truth often from a (justified believed) falsehood. >E. Gettier, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Causal theory of reference, >Belief, >Justified assertibility. Condition: (3) if not-p> not- (S believes that p) excludes that often. II 194 Knowledge/belief/Nozick: through senile stubborness knowledge becomes belief. - Similar: E.g. knowledge of future brainwashing, then we try to "cement" belief. II 194f Knowledge/belief/local/global/Nozick: condition (3) should be better (indexicality, "now", "here") a local belief than a global one. - Otherwise danger of stubbornness. >Index words, >Indexicality, >Reference, >Contextuality. II 198 Need/possibility/knowledge/Nozick: if ~ p> ~ (S believes that p) necessary condition for knowledge, then possibility of skepticism shows that no knowledge exists. >Skepticism. II 204 f Knowledge/non-seclusion/NozickVsskepticism: Knowledge is not closed under known logical implication (VsSkepticism. >Closure. Skepticism: knowledge is closed: that is the (skeptical) principle of closure of knowledge: K (p >> q) & Kp> Kq: I should know allegedly the implied by the known? Notation: K = knowledge, operator "somebody knows". Nozick: but that would be merely belief, not knowledge. Cf. >Logical Omniscience. II 206 The situation where q is wrong, could be quite different from the one where p is false. - E.g. that you were born in a certain city, implies that you were born on Earth, but not vice versa. II 227 Non-closure of knowledge: means, that knowledge will vary with the facts, because it is in connection with them. >Covariance. Knowledge/belief/closeness/Nozick: merely true belief is complete under known logical implication. - Because knowledge is more true belief, we need an additional condition that is not-complete under implication. Belief is only knowledge when it covaries with facts. - But that is not enough - it depends on what happens if p is false. Problem: a co-varying belief with facts is not closed. Punchline: because knowledge involves belief, it is not closed. VsSkepticism: the argument of skepticism needs the fact that knowledge needs covariance. II 223 Knowledge/induction/connection/Nozick: knowledge is based on facts that would otherwise have been different. Nozick: In the past. - Therefore, the relevant non-p-world is not a possible world, which is so far identical with the real world (the actual world), and diverges from now on immediately. >Possible worlds. It is logically possible that it begins to diverge in a moment. ((s) elsewhere Lewis like Nozick: in the past there would have had to be a change, if I now suddenly act differently). We have connections to the facts in the past that determine our predictions. >Determinism/Lewis, >Covariance. II 227 Knowing that (x)Px is unequal knowledge that every single thing is P: the universal quantification has different truth conditions as the all-removal. - "(x)Px" could be wrong, although "Pa" true._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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