Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Knowledge: Knowledge is a conscious relationship to sentences or propositions, which legitimately attributes to them truth or falsehood. What is known is true. Conversely, it does not apply that everything that is true is also known. See also knowledge how, propositional knowledge, realism, abilities, competence, truth, facts, situations, language, certainty, beliefs, omniscience, logical knowledge, reliability_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Saul A. Kripke on Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments
II 240f Knowledge/Hintikka: "strong knowledge": has very high standards. KripkeVsHintikka: when Hintikaa is confronted with counter examples, he condemns them as popular or as "weak" versions of knowledge. KripkeVs: > Method, >Knowledge/Hintikka._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |
||
> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Knowledge ...
