Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Knowledge: Knowledge is a conscious relationship to sentences or propositions, which legitimately attributes to them truth or falsehood. What is known is true. Conversely, it does not apply that everything that is true is also known. See also knowledge how, propositional knowledge, realism, abilities, competence, truth, facts, situations, language, certainty, beliefs, omniscience, logical knowledge, reliability_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Nelson Goodman on Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments
I 92 Knowledge/Goodman: e.g. it could be that someone asks me if I have seen the football coach among my audience. And falsely I answer to the negative. And I have even seen all of my audience. >Seeing. --- III 105 Forgery: because my knowledge of the difference between the two images influences the relationship of the current to all future examining, it also shapes the character of my present examining. >Forgery. --- IV 17 Empiricism asserts that knowledge depends on experience. >">Empiricism. GoodmanVs: that can be misleading: because the dependence is mutual: experience also depends on knowledge. Routine often goes unnoticed. Background knowledge is almost always necessary. IV 204 Example: suppose you are rightly convinced that the top card from a well-shuffled deck is not Diamonds Two, and let us assume further that this proves to be true. Can you claim to have known it? Knowledge which is uncertain, is hardly a more fortunate idea than knowledge that is certain. IV 212 Knowledge needs 1. truth, 2. belief and 3. hardening. Understanding does not need any of these. >Truth, >Understanding. IV 213 You do not know the familiar! (To the question: "How do you know what is right?")._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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> Counter arguments against Goodman
> Counter arguments in relation to Knowledge ...
