Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Essence, philosophy: the essence of an object is understood to mean one or more properties without which the object is inconceivable. Critics argue that such necessary properties can only be attributed to concepts, but not to empirical objects. See also features, essentialism, ultimate justification, properties, metaphysics, concepts, necessity de re, substance._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
David Wiggins on Essence - Dictionary of Arguments
II 286 Essence/RussellVsEssentialism: it is a purely linguistic question which properties we use in the presence of a name. - So names might have essence, things can not have an essence. Socrates is no more stable than the things that happen to him. "Mr Smith" is a collective name of incidents, i.e. a speaker referred to something completely unknowable. Wiggins per: an ontology of events is possible: (e.g. M. Proust: houses, streets, fleeting as the years, thin layers of experience). >Ontology, >Existence, >Objects, >Unambiguity, >Reference, >Individuation, >Identification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
||
