Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Perception, philosophy: perceptions are conscious or unconscious processings of changes of state or events in the environment or within a living organism. Perceptions are happening in the present. Memories and imaginations are not perceptions. In language usage the expression of perception is used both for the process of perception and for the perceived. See also stimuli, sensations, sense perceptions, computation, memory, ideas._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Christopher Peacocke on Perception - Dictionary of Arguments
passim Peacocke Thesis: experience, perception: does never exist without sensation. --- I 8 Perception Theory/tradition: Thesis: feelings are not part of the perception - Adequacy Thesis: all essential lie in 'appears to the subject ..' plus some complex conditions such as objects and circumstances. I 11 PeacockeVs: it is undecidable whether two trees are the same size and at the same distance, or at different distsances and different in size - and we assume that they are the same size, even if we see different sizes - (added knowledge: brings representation into the game). I 19 Perception/Peacocke: needs terms. I 91f Observation Terms/Theoretical Terms: Square: - must be experienced as such, an X-ray tube not. - For scientists, the X-ray tube may be constructed entirely differently, for a lay person not - in this case it is a different term. - Sensitivity for property: necessary but not sufficient condition: - E.g. 'tomato-like': appearance or taste, here is no theory required. - Square: a minimal theory of perspective is required. - There is nothing 'square-like' what corresponds to 'tomato-like'. - Without square term no sensation of square, (not only no representation). - A perspectively distorted square is perceived as a square, but not perceived as distorted. (> Higher order: >description levels). - Not so with tomato-like: cannot be known as a tomato. (> Forgery). - 'Tomato-like' is not a criterion, otherwise tomato would be an observation term! - Representation: tomato, not 'tomato-like'. I 154 'As'/seeing-as/perception/thinking/Peacocke: E.g. 'This acid burns the table': only liquid is seen, not 'as acid'._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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> Counter arguments against Peacocke
> Counter arguments in relation to Perception
