Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Truth makers, philosophy: Some theories assume that, in the case of true statements, there must be something that is the reason why they are true, the so-called truth makers. Opponents of the truth maker theories represent the view that these truth makers are ultimately a repetition of the description of a state of affairs in other words, whereby a description cannot be made true by another description. One problem is the specification of truth makers when it comes to statements about non-existence. See also reason, justification, truth, facts, universals, natural laws, negation, causality, causal theory, causal explanation, ontology, non-existence, non-factualism.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Roderick Chisholm on Truthmakers - Dictionary of Arguments

II 137
Make true/truth maker/Mulligan/Smith: what does make "that" true? - The statements made on the occasion of a perception can be quite different - the same holds for "this".
All perceptions could disappear without the words losing their meaning.
>That-clauses.


Mulligan, Kevin & Smith, Barry. A Husserlian Theory of Indexicality. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


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