Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Truth value: The truth value is that what is attributed to a statement or an interpreted logical formula with regard to whether it is true or false. In classical logic, there are two truth values, true and false. In multi-valued logics there can be three to infinitely many truth values. In the latter case, these are often regarded as probabilities. For trivalent logics, the third value is often "indeterminate", "neither true nor false" or "neither proved nor disproved". See also negation, strong negation, weak negation, intuitionism, probability, fuzzy logic, extensionality._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Michael E. Dummett on Truth Values - Dictionary of Arguments
I 11 f Def Truth Value/Frege/Dummett: of the sentence: the reference - the (Fregean) " Bedeutung" ("meaning") of the sentence. I 20f Dummett: E.g. assuming the condition for true/Fals would be stated, but the two truth values were only marked with A and B, then it would be impossible to figure out which one, A or B, stood for t. One would have to recognize at least in a sample sentence what weight the speakers assign to the assertoric statement of this sentence. II 112 Def Non-designated Truth Value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be wrong. Def Designated truth value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be true - this is irrelevant for atomic sentences, only relevant for the way they contribute to a complex sentence - i.e. what the condition for an designated truth value for a composite sentence is. The truth value of the whole sentence does not arise simply from the truth value of the sub-sentences - or the subsentences do not only contribute their own truth value - or if we had a meaning theory for the whole language, perhaps we might not be able to explain the meanings of the logical constants by verification of the subsentences. - (These are three formulations for the same fact). >Compositionality. - - - III (a) 20 Truth Value/Dummett: not by property of statements, but by behavior. - Compared to bet/command: requires: the antecedent lies in the power of the receiver: II (a) 21 Gap: if the child does not go out, it cannot have forgotten the jacket. - "Unconditional command": = material conditional: here there is no gap. III (a) 20 Meaning/Truth Value/Bet/Command/Dummett: There is an asymmetry: disobedience clearly leads to the right of disapproval - obedience does not lead to the right of reward (gap). Consequence: truth values are more likely to be extracted from bets (win/lose) than from command/behavior. III (a) 28 Designated Truth Value/Dummett: true or conditional with false antecedent (EFQ, >ex falso quodlibet) Non-designated truth value: wrong or the object is nonexistent. Validity/Multi-valued logic: valid in multi-value logic are the formulas that have a designated truth value for each allocation. >Multi-valued logic._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
||
> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Values
