Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory. The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability. A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence. B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas. C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

John R. Searle on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments

Perler I 142
True/false/Searle: true and false are meta-intentional predicates. There are not only in the metalanguage.
, >Object-language, >Intentionality/Searle.
- - -
III 177
Truth/Searle: all true statements about the world can be asserted without contradiction at the same time. Yes, if they cannot be asserted without contradiction at the same time, they cannot all be true. Of course, there are always problems of vagueness, indeterminacy, family similarity, open texture, contextual dependency, incommensurability of theories, ambiguity, idealization, under determination of the theory by the evidence.
>Context dependence, >Incommensurability, >Ambiguity, >Vagueness, >Idealization.
But these are characteristics of our systems of representation, not of reality independent of representation! Truth in a scheme is a property of the scheme and not a real inconsistency.
>Reality/Searle, VsSearle: >Reality/Seel, >Representation/Searle, >Underdetermination/Quine.
III 185
Truth/Reality/Searle: there is a simple but deep reason why truth and reality cannot coincide as the naive external realist must believe, according to many philosophers. Every representation a forteriori and every true representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others! They are always within the framework of a certain conceptual scheme and from a certain point of view. ((s) QuineVs, DavidsonVs). There is an infinite number of different points of view (Searle pro). Each representation has an aspect. But an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view.
III 218
Truth/Searle: truth applies to statements, truth is a term that implies evaluation, trustworthiness and quoting gives us a criterion of trustworthiness.
>Disquotation, >Truth definitions, >Truth theories.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

Perler I
Dominik Perler
Markus Wild
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005

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