Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory. The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability. A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence. B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas. C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Grover, D. L. on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments

Horwich I 340
True/truth/property/Prosentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB: even though "true" is not redundant, it does not attribute any property. E.g. "It-is-not-true-that" Rome is the center of the world, "but it was-true-that" Rome was (is) the center of the world. Also, "true" is not redundant: it is the formation of the opposite of a sentence. "It is not true that": problem: e.g. "When the switch is up, the light is on." For most sentences this is hardly possible.
I 348
Camp, Grover,Belnap/thesis: truth is not a property.
I 356 f
Truth/Field/CGB: (Field 1972): truth is the "original purpose" of the concept of truth. The concept of truth is to use the expressions of others to draw conclusions about the world.
(I) We say under what circumstances something is true that someone else says.
(II) How we get from the belief in the truth of something to a belief about the world.
CGB: yet, there is no truth property.
I 360
Therefore, it cannot be attributed.
I 363
Truth Predicate/generalization/Quine/CGB: e.g. what is the relation between a sentence and the world if it is true? That is not possible without truth predicate.
>Prosentential theory
, >Truth predicate.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Grover, D. L.

Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992

D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)

See external reference in the individual contributions.
Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Grover, D. L.
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z