Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Reason, philosophy: reason (German “Vernunft”, prudence) is the ability to get insight. The concept of reason in this sense is distinguished in the German Idealism from the concept of reason in the sense of “Verstand” (subtlety), whereby the latter refers to the recognition of regularities and differences and the former refers to the justification of principles which are the basis of the regularities. See also mind, spirit, idealism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David Hume on Reason - Dictionary of Arguments

I 7
Mind/Hume: the purpose is to make passion socially acceptable.
I 24
It is always about the probability calculus and rules.
I 117
Mind/reason/Hume: the mind reflects the past on the principle of experience. Imagination: imagination reflects the future according to the principle of habit. Belief: belief is the link between these two dimensions of the spirit. Time: time transforms itself when the subject constitutes itself in the mind.
I 21
Reason/Hume: reason does not determine the action - affects determine action!
I 25
Treatise/Hume: it is not contrary to reason to want the downfall of the world in order to prevent a crack in one's own finger.
I 26
Reason/Hume: reason is applied to a world that had previously been there. ((s) So reason does not create the world because reason, practice and morality are indifferent - not because of the circumstances).
I 40
Reason/Hume: reason is sedated affection; it makes us judge the improper components in our affections. True duality exists not between affect (nature) and reason (the artificial), but between the overall context of nature and the spirit that affects this relationship.
Association: must not be sedated.
Stegmüller IV 283
Reason/morality/ethics/Hume/Stegmüller: reason can never be the motive for or against an action. Passions and preferences are logically independent of conclusions. However, there are practical and reasonable preferences. Mackie: dispassion also does not allow a clear view of things.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

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