Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Vagueness, philosophy: there are descriptions of objects or situations that are necessarily not fully determined. For example, the indication whether a given hue is still red or already orange is not always decidable. It is a property of the language to provide vague predicates. Whether vagueness is a property of the world is controversial. See also sorites, indeterminacy, under-determinateness, intensification, penumbra.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Vagueness - Dictionary of Arguments

I 226
Vagueness: can be useful - it leaves the truth value untouched.
I 84
It is known that color words are grouped very differently in different languages, the color boundaries are vague in both languages. "Red" is a good translation of a native sentence, for example, if it resembles vagueness.
>Language acquisition
.
I 156 ff
Learning/vagueness/Quine: Vagueness plays an important role in the first learning phase. Distribution around central norm values. "More or less red" can be more fundamental for learning than the "red norm".
I 228f
Ambiguity/Quine: is something other than vagueness.
>Ambiguity.
I 334
Vagueness, ambiguity and transience of the designation are characteristics of linguistic expressions and do not extend to the designated objects.
- - -
VII (b) 27
Replaceability/Leibniz: replaceability salva seritate should provide synonymy.
Quine: this does not save the synonyms conceived in this way from vagueness.
- - -
II 48
Bivalence/Divalence/Vagueness/Quine: I do not care very much about bivalence, mainly it is good for simplification. Besides the undecidable facts of the realists regarding physical objects, the vagueness of the terms has to be taken into account. Also here there are problems caused by bivalence:
Sorites: For example, if after removing a single grain from a heap of sand, there is always a heap left, then complete induction is used to ensure that a heap remains after removing all the grains.
II 128ff
Insufficient individuation has nothing to do with vagueness of demarcation. We are used to tolerating the vagueness of boundaries. (>Fine structure of a table). What the vagueness of boundaries on physical objects boils down to is that there are almost identical objects that are almost the same circumference and only differ in the inclusion or exclusion of several peripheral molecules. Any of these almost circumferential objects could serve as the table, without anyone being smarter about it. That is the vagueness of the table.
- - -
VI 24/25
Science/verification/Quine: much of science is shielded by excuses such as vagueness from unreal conditional sentences or dispositions from simple tests of experience.
>Verification.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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