Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Inscrutability, philosophy: the inscrutability of reference is an expression by W.V.O. Quine (Quine, “Word and Object”, 1960) for the problem that - even in a particular situation - it cannot be determined in principle to which object the use of an expression refers. See also uncertainty of translation, Gavagai, indeterminacy, reference, translation, pointing, ostension._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Brian Loar on Inscrutability of reference - Dictionary of Arguments
II 160 Language/grammar/Lewis/Loar: Lewis shares Quine’s view of the inscrutability of reference and denies that for the language of a community, a certain grammar can be assigned, if we have not already created an arbitrary scale for the assessment of grammars. >Reference, >Grammar/Lewis, >Grammar/Quine. There are always different equally simple ways of analysis. >Hypotheses, >Analytical hypothesis, >Indeterminacy/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |