Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Transcendental, philosophy: The concept of the transcendental goes back to Kant and concerns the effort to deal with the conditions of knowledge in contrast to the mere acceptance or acceptance of experiences and sensory perceptions. See also epistemology, perception, experience, ultimate justification, verification, confirmation, possibility, contingency, a priori._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jerry Fodor on Transcendentals - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 79 Transcendental/argument/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: Davidson's transcendental argument for the principle of charity takes this form: if we do not assume that the speaker rightly believes most things, then language acquisition by the radical interpreter is impossible. >Radical interpretation, >Language acquisition. IV 80 Language acquisition is possible, however. So it must be assumed that most of the speaker's beliefs are true. >Beliefs/Davidson. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: there is no clear reason to believe the second premise (that radical interpretation is possible). Therefore, the transcendental argument fails. IV 105 Transcendental: what made the arguments transcendental was the assumption that radical interpretation is metaphysically impossible if holism does not apply. >Holism. --- Kripke I 46 Metaphysical/Kripke: what could have been different is precisely a question that cannot be answered empirically at all, hence it is metaphysical. Contrary: epistemic._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |
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> Counter arguments against Fodor
> Counter arguments in relation to Transcendentals
