Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Nominalism: nominalism is the view that universals (for example, triangles, blackness) are merely artificial constructions from individual cases. The linguistic expressions are merely names for these constructs. See also universalism, conceptualism, general terms, categories, generalization, generality.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Ullin Thomas Place on Nominalism - Dictionary of Arguments

Armstrong II (b) 34
Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place) pro: then properties (as individuals) are all exactly similar properties Representatives of universals (Armstrong): assumes many individuals with the same property.
Universal realist: Assumes exactly one universal for each class. >Similarity
, >Universals.
- - -
Armstrong II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a nuclear higher order state that connects the universals.
Armstrong II (c) 97
Property/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals! - Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same" - ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! - ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "the identical causes the identical"
Armstrong II (c) 97
Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of different universals for every similarity that is not exact! Multiplication - MartinVsArmstrong: Similarity ontologically as basic concept.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


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