Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Linguisticism: Linguisticism in philosophy is the view that many or all philosophical problems can be solved (or dissolved) by paying closer attention to language. See also Language, Linguistic turn, Analytic philosophy, Everyday language.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Ullin Thomas Place on Linguisticism - Dictionary of Arguments

Armstrong II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists they can not accept an atomic higher level state, connecting the universals. >Universals
, cf. >Nominalism.
- - -
Place III 107
Linguisticism/Place: Armstrong and Martin insinuate me to be too extreme.
Solution: to accept that the objects of desire and those which are joined by counterfactual conditionals, do not exist and may never exist.
Problem: that the quantification is not allowed over non-existent objects. >Objects of thought, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief.
An intensional quantifier logic is not yet developed. ((s) Cf. >Intensional Logic/Hintikka).
- - -
Armstrong II 106
Language/object/Place: "I want an apple, I do not want a sentence to be true".

_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Place
> Counter arguments in relation to Linguisticism

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z