Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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Ullin Thomas Place on Causal Relation - Dictionary of Arguments
Martin II 134 Necessary Causal Relation/Martin: E.g. square pegs do not fit into round holes in the same way round pegs fit. Contingent causal relation: E.g. freezing water expands. Not defined by volume, but by microstructure. - - - Armstrong II (d) 154 Humean View/Place: Logical Relations like Necessity or contingency exist only between propositions. - Causal relation is only between actual and individual situations. Situation: a) States (properties do not change) b) Event: (properties change). Causal necessity: is a matter of counterfactual conditionals. - In nature there is no logical necessity (de re, HumeVsKripke). >Necessity a posteriori/Kripke. Causal necessity is a special case of logical necessity. - Statements about causal necessity are always contingent if their denial does not make them contradictory. - Situations are separated. Armstrong II (d) 155 Dispositional Properties/Place: are needed, because we speak about sentences with causal relations, not about their truthmakers - the dispositional statement provides the premise - the truth of a proposition depends on the situation as truthmaker, but truthmaker cannot simply consist in juxtaposition of cause and effect. >Truthmakers/Armstrong. Otherwise, precisely the necessary connection that provides the counterfactual conditional would be omitted - the contingency refers to causal statements, not to relations between situations._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
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> Counter arguments against Place
