Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Ullin Thomas Place on Categoricalness - Dictionary of Arguments
Place I 22 Categorical/Place: only sentences can be categorical, not entities. Martin: "purely categorical": only the existence of the bearer of properties - and spatio-temporal relations between its parts. PlaceVsArmtrong: then microstructure is not "purely categorical" but only it's existence, and not the existence of the parts (the "structure")._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
||
> Counter arguments against Place
