# Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Induction: Induction in logic is a type of reasoning in which we draw general conclusions from specific observations. It is the opposite of deductive reasoning, where we draw specific conclusions from general premises. See also Deduction, Grue, Generalization, Generality, Conclusions.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Ullin Thomas Place on Induction - Dictionary of Arguments

Armstrong III 50
Induction/Mackie: Mackie is per inductive (probability) counterfactual conditionals. (>Counterfactual conditionals
).
ArmstrongVsMackie - but: Armstrong per induction: it is rational.
Armstrong III 52
Induction/Armstrong: Induction from the observed to the unobserved: are invalid, nevertheless necessarily(!) rational. - Because of the conclusion to the Best Explanation. If not best explanation, what should be better? - The unobserved will behave like the observed (alternatives are more poorly justified). >Best Explanation.
Armstrong III 58
Induction/Logical Possibility: that all emeralds are grue has the same logical possibility (percentage) as that they are green - the observed emeralds are green - but they are also grue - the mathematics is the same.
- - -
Armstrong II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a higher order atomic state that connects the universals.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

> Counter arguments against Place
> Counter arguments in relation to Induction