Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Sense, philosophy: sense is a property of statements which makes the determination of the truth value (true or false) possible, although not guaranteed. Even false statements make sense; otherwise their falsehood could not be established. What is meaningless, therefore, is what cannot be negated. Statements about the future allow an assessment of probabilities if they are sensible without having a truth value. Wishes and commands are sensible and understandable if they can be reformulated into negative statements. See also understanding, negation, truth values, verification, determination, indeterminacy, probability, Fregean sense._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Sense - Dictionary of Arguments
II 3 Sense/useful/useless/Wittgenstein: when it make sense to say: "There are four primary colors", it must also make sense to say: "There are five primary colors." See also II 113, II 167, II 372. II 59 Sense/fraud/error/Wittgenstein: what allows us to judge the world correctly, also allows us to misjudge it. >Judgments. II 69 Sense/nonsense/useful/useless/Wittgenstein: E.g "This sound is red" is not wrong, but nonsense - to name something a color is to say that it obeys certain grammatical rules - limit: I cannot say, sounds would have properties that do not belong to the colors, because then I would have to say sensibly that colors have properties that they do not have. - ((s) I would have to be able to deny it.) - E.g. "colors are not loud". - Sense and nonsense have nothing in common- meaningless word combinations are not part of the language - grammar sets the limit. II 171 Sense/Wittgenstein. We can talk of "sense" without giving the expression a clear meaning. II 402 Rule/sense/Wittgenstein: E.g. the command "replace seven by zero" makes no sense, except that it specifies a rule. - ((s) rules do not need to give sense beyond that). >Rules. II 412 Proof/sense/Wittgenstein: nonsense: to say, only the evidence gives the question a sense. - Correct: the evidence provides a possibility to respond. - With that it gives the question a sense. - ((s) Third, intermediate instance.) --- III 144 Sense/Show/Tell/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: the phrase is used, to express the idea - on the other hand, the sense can only be specified by specifying the truth conditions or repeating the sentence. --- VII 27 Sense/Tractatus/Tetens: controversial thesis: that only descriptive sentences made sense. - Ethics: Problem: normative statements are meaningless. >Meaning. --- I 22 Definition sense of the sentence/Tractatus: (4.2:) His agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of facts. Hintikka: it follows that the identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be claimed linguistically. (Tractatus 6.2322). I 149 Picture Theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: names are points, sentences, arrows, they have sense. The sense is determined by the two poles of true and false. >Picture theory._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |