Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Self, philosophy: the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John Locke on Self - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 92/93 I/self/memory/identity/Locke/Anscombe: Question: couldn't the thinking substance that thought after the action was done be different from the substance that thought during the action, "I'm just about to do it"? >Person/Locke, >Identity/Locke, >Mind/Locke, >Thinking/Locke, >Substance/Locke, >Experience/Locke._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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