|Pain, philosophy of mind: the philosophical discussion deals with the peculiarities of the concept of pain in contrast to other concepts such as perceptions, sensations and stimuli. In particular, it is about the relationship between physical and mental realization of pain. See also mind body problem, physical/psychic, rigidity, possible worlds, possible world semantics, perception, introspection, private language, necessity, certainty._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|II 192 ff
Pain/Dennett: E.g. Is a fetus capable of suffering: so far, one cannot make such statements, and there is also no reason to believe that it will be the case sometime later.
Perhaps a natural boundary reveals itself eventually, but we should not count on it while we still cannot even imagine it.
Pain/Animal/Dennett: The phenomenon of pain is neither uniform nor simple in different biological species. We even experience that with ourselves.
E.g. Do we experience the stimuli that prevent us from taking a twisted posture during sleep as pain?
In order for sstates of pain to be important there must be a suffering subject for which they have meaning!.
E.g. Suppose you could shift all your pain to the last five minutes of the year.
Dennett. I would certainly be willing, even if the pain would be doubled.
However, this would have the amazing consequence that the "benefactor" who made this possible would double the suffering in the world and would even receive gratitude!.
The terrible thing is not the suffering, but the event which caused it. E.g. the loss of a job, loss of a person.
If we want to reduce the suffering in the world, we need not examine the brains of the creatures, but their lives._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005