Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Relation-Theory A. Relation-Theory: takes belief to be a relation to internal objects (entities). Virtually all authors are against the assumption of thoughts as internal objects. See also intensional objects, intensions, propositional attitudes, mentalism. B. Relational Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter (Science and Necessity Cambridge University Press 1990 p55) assumes universals (e.g. sets, numbers, properties) and relations between them in order to explain the problem of quantities. See also change, motion, quantities, universals, Platonism, nominalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stephen Schiffer on Relation-Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
I 8 Relation Theory/Schiffer: "There is something that he believes" - can only be inferred with referential quantification (not with substitutional quantification) . Substitutional Quantification: is true if a substitution instance of "Elmer believes that S" is true. Referential Quantification: "..believes x" whereby an x must exist. Substitutional Quantification: allows no relation theory because the substitutional quantification is consistent with every representation of the logical form of substitution instances that make the quantification true. I 15 Relation Theory/Schiffer: Relation to sentences: Davidson (1969)(1): to the public language of the attributing. Carnap (1947)(2): to the public language of the believer. Loar: public language of the attributing, but the semantic attributes (which determine the content) are in the Tarski-style (non-public). -Then there is nothing about the role of expressions or use in population. >Language use, >Language community. Problem: then beliefs must be individuated by interpersonal functional states - that does not work with Tarski. >Truth definition/Tarski. 1. Donald Davidson (1969). "The individuation of events". In: In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. pp. 216-34 2. Rudolf carnap (1947). Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press --- I 70 SchifferVsPropositionalism/VsRelation Theory with proposition as an object: if true, the proposition would include as content either dog property itself (this does not work because of shmog) or way of givenness of it. Way of givenness: We have no clue what it should be. >Way of givenness. I 73 Relation Theory/Schiffer: here for representation (= sentences) in mentalese (instead of propositions). >Sentences, >Propositions. Meaning in mentalese determines meaning in public language, not vice versa. (+) >Mentalese (Laguage of thought), >Everyday language._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Relation-Theory
