Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Scope, range, logic, philosophy: range is a property of quantifiers or operators to be able to be applied to a larger or smaller range. For example, the necessity operator N may be at different points of a logical formula. Depending on the positioning, the resulting statement has a considerably changed meaning. E.g. great range "It is necessary that there is an object that ..." or small range "There is an object that is necessarily ....". See also quantifiers, operators, general invariability, stronger/weaker, necessity, Barcan Formula._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
W.V.O. Quine on Scope - Dictionary of Arguments
I 244 Scope is ambiguous: it cannot be decided by parentheses. - Indefinite singular term: "one", "some", "each member" - "not a"/"not every" - "I think one is such that ..."/"is one such I believe ... ". >Singular terms. I 243 ff Scope/Quine: e.g. "large European butterfly": should this apply to butterflies that are large by European standards, or to all large butterflies that happen to come from Europe? I 244 The delicate thing about this question is that it cannot be clarified by a decision between two bracket positions. There is no such problem if adjectives are used categorically i.e. not attributively: For example, "Round black box" and "Round black box" do not need to be distinguished. The problem is particularly central with indefinite singular terms: (1) If (any) member contributes something, he/she gets a badge. (2) If each member contributes something, I will be surprised. (1) Claims from each member, if they contribute something, they get a badge. Sentence (2) does not claim accordingly from each member: If he/she contributes anything, I will be surprised. I 246 There are 3 reasons why (1) and (2) are not ambiguous. 1) "it": We cannot see only the first sentence as the scope of any member. 2) A simple and irreducible characteristic of German usage is that "everyone" always demands the shortest possible range. 3) "any" always requires the greater of two possible scopes. This third reason applies to (3): (3) If (any) member contributes something, I will be surprised. I 275 ff "So that" is supposed to eliminate ambiguities of the scope. The simplification of theories is the central motif behind the radical artificiality of modern logical notation. I 277 We need to include rules of timeliness to eliminate ambiguities of the kind. "George married a widow" and "George married Maria, and Maria is a widow". I 288 The scope of a quantifier does not quite coincide with the scope of an indefinite singular term "all" or "something", because this encompasses the indefinite singular term itself. Rather, the scope of a quantifier is the clause that the "so that" determines. - - - VII (h) 148 Necessity/possibility/Quine: is not a general feature of the objects concerned but depends on the way of reference. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine: it is not allowed to quantify into modal contexts from outside. VII (h) 149 It is therefore not a question of singular terms, but of the scope of quantification. VII (h) 154 Scope/Russell: a change in the scope of a description is neutral to the truth value of any sentence. Quine: but only if the description designates something. >Quantification, >Opacity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
||
