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Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Redundancy theory: comprises the thesis that nothing is added to a true sentence when it is said that it is true. In other words, each sentence asserts its own truth; the appending of the truth predicate "is true" would thus be redundant. See also judgment, truth theory, truth definition, deflationism, minimalism, disquotationalism, all that he said is true, predication.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Redundancy Theory - Dictionary of Arguments

VII (i) 164
Redundancy Theory/Quine: it is doubtful whether the connection of "Fa" with "Fa is true" is analytic.
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Redundancy Theory/QuineVsRedundancy Theory/truth/Quine: the truth has been said to disappear, because the truth of the sentence is simply the sentence. ("Disapearance theory of truth")
This is wrong: the quotation marks must not be taken lightly. We can only say that the adjective "true" is dispensable if it is applied to sentences that explicitly lie before us.
Truth-predicate/true/generalization/Quine: is necessary to say that all sentences of a certain form are wrong. Or
For example, a sentence that is not literal (not literally passed down) is true or false. Or
E.g. that the slander paragraphs cannot be applied to true sentences or
E.g. that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
N.B.: if you translate such sentences into the predicate logic, the subject of the truth- predicate is not a quotation, but a variable. These are the cases where the truth-predicate is not superfluous.
Disquotation/truth/definition/Quine: the disquotational approach may still be useful when it comes to defining truth.
Truth-Definition/truth/Quine: it identifies all discernible truths that the truth of the sentence is communicated by the sentence itself. But that is not a strict definition; it does not show us who could eliminate the adjective "true"
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from all contexts in which it can occur grammatically. It only shows us where we can eliminate it in contexts with quotations.
Paradox/Quine: we have seen above (see liar paradox) that definability can contain a self-contradiction. It is remarkable how easily definable we found truth in the present context. How easy it can be and at the same time possibly fatal.
Solution/Tarski: Separation object language/meta language.
Recursion/Tarski/Quine: shows how the truth-term is first applied to atomic sentences and then to compositions of any complexity.
Problem: Tarski could not yet define truth because of the variables. Sentences with variables can be true in some cases and false in others. (Open Sentences). Only closed sentences (where all variables are bound by quantifiers) can be true or false.
Fulfillment/Recursion/Tarski/Quine: what Tarski recursively defines is fulfillment of a sentence by an object; is not truth. These objects are then the possible values of the free variables. After that, truth trivially results as a waste product.
Def Truth/Fulfillment/Tarski: a closed sentence is true if it is fulfilled by the sequence of length 0, so to speak.
Liar Paradox/Tarski/Quine: Tarski's construction is masterly and coherent, but why doesn't it ultimately solve the paradox? This is shown by the translation into symbolic logic when the sentence is formulated in object language (see paradoxes above, last section).
Paradox/logical form/liar/Quine: the word "true" has the context "x is true" in the explicit reconstruction where "x" is the subject of quantifiers.
Problem: the recursive definition of truth and fulfillment does not show how to "fulfill x".
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or "x is true" is eliminated.
Solution: this only works if "x is true" or "fulfilled" is predicated by an explicitly given open or closed sentence.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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