Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Reductionism, philosophy: reductionism is a collective term for attempts, to either trace back statements in a subject area to statements from a sub-area of this subject area or equating statements of a subject area with statements of another subject area. The main point here is the justification of such transfers. Reductionism in the narrower sense is the thesis that reduction is possible. Typical reductionisms exist in the domain of the philosophy of mind. See also holism, eliminativism, materialism, physicalism, functionalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
W.V.O. Quine on Reductionism - Dictionary of Arguments
Quine VII (b) 40 Reductionism/QuineVsCarnap: his space time quadrupel set preuppose a sedentary world - the quadruples still increase the set of the general properties. Refined form of reductionism: any incident either increases the probability (likelihood) of a statement or deminishes it. - - - Schiffer I 2 QuineVsReductionism: the semantic cannot be reduced to more fundamental facts because of the indeterminacy of translation - so he saw the whole semantics skeptical. - - - Quine IV 412 Def Reductionism (radical form): according to him, every single meaningful expression can be translated into an expression of immediate experience. QuineVsReductionism: radical form: erroneous translatability of individual observations into individual expressions. >HolismVs. Weaker form: still the idea: each (synthetic) statement is clearly assigned a certain range of sensory irritations. (False). Vs:Reactions to sensory stimuli are not rigid in humans. (>"Super Spartan"/Putnam). Two dogmas: 1. Reductionism 2. Differentiation analytic/synthetic. - - - VII (b) 39 Radical Reductionism/Quine: 1. Example: Carnap's translation into sense data language plus logical notation plus higher set theory. Empiricism/Quine: is often wasteful in its ontology. Carnap: was the first empiricist to consistently reduce. VII (b) 40 But his work is still just a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presuppose a world with little movement ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement, should be the guideline for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: did not appear to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain general characteristics (over all features) and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. But this does not help to see how a statement of the form "property q is at x,y,z,t" could ever be translated into Carnap's original sense data language and logic. Problem: the "is on" remains an undefined connection. The canon shows us how to use it, but not how to eliminate it! Carnap later recognized this and no longer used it. Reductionism/Dogma/Quine: 2. more refined form: each utterance is associated with a uniform range of possible sensations, so that each occurrence increases either the likelihood of the truth of the statement. VII (b) 41 or diminishes it. This is of course included in the verification theory. Quine Thesis: (comes from Carnap's "structure"): our statements stand before the tribunal of experience not individually, but as a whole corpus. (>Quine-Duhem thesis)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
||
> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Reductionism
