Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Justification, philosophy: justification is a condition for knowledge which a) is fulfilled or not fulfilled by the explanation of the origin of the information or b) by a logical examination of the argument. For a), theories such as the causal theory of knowledge or reliability theories have been developed. See also verification, examination, verification, proofs, externalism.
Justification in a broader sense is a statement about the occurrence of an action or a choice. See also explanations, ultimate justification, reasons.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Colin McGinn on Justification - Dictionary of Arguments

I 184
In order for knowledge to be justified, the naturalistic part of the theory must supply the basis for a normative reconstruction of our beliefs.
>Belief
.
Question: would this theory be metatheoretically accessible?
But the solution of the naturalistic aspect does not automatically solve the normative aspect: it could be that we draw up a complete theory of the natural base of the faculties of the mind without getting a theory of the applicability of normative terms such as "knowledge" and "justification".
I 184/85
Justification/Belief/Knowledge/McGinn: Then the transcendental could come into play on a purely normative level, because it would be possible that we do not understand by means of which normative principles produce the totality of natural facts underlying our beliefs produce knowledge in the proper sense.
>Transcendentals.
That means, it could be that although we understand how we "factually" come to our beliefs, we do not have access to what justifies these beliefs.
I 184/85
Knowledge/McGinn: there is no a priori reason to believe that the capability of our first-stage knowledge systems can be imitated at the level of meta-theory.
>Levels(Order), >Description level.
I 186
A reasonably naturalistic conception of our cognitive faculties would even suggest just the opposite.
I 185
E.g. language: from our ability to learn our native tongue very quickly does not follow that we even remotely understand the principles of this learning ability.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001


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