Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
|Realism, philosophy: realism is a collective term for theories which, in principle, believe that it is possible for us to acquire knowledge about objects of the external world that is independent from us as perceptual subjects. A strong realism typically represents the thesis that it would make sense to even create hypotheses about basically unknowable objects. See also metaphysical realism, internal realism, universal realism, constructivism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Roderick Chisholm on Realism - Dictionary of Arguments
Chisholm per extreme realism: there is an indefinite number of necessary things - even not-exemplified characteristics such as round-and square-be. >Round square, cf. >Metaphysical realism.
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Naive realism/Rutte: with the question: "does the object have the color also when we do not look", we do not mean that the object moves when we go out, but we ask with it whether it has the mode of appearance.
((s) And this question only makes sense if it is related to subjects.)
Rutte: to speak of the mode of appearance of the object means as much as: the thing has this mode of appearance, even if nobody perceives it.
Perception problem: consists not in the question whether we can perceive things as they are, but whether we have good reasons to conclude from our experiences to a causer of these experiences.
Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
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