Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Reality, philosophy: A. It is controversial, which should be counted to reality, that is to say, the set of objects and states which occur in the world. Theories differ strongly regarding the definitions of facts and situations or the consideration of internal states of subjects. Thus, a situation can be described in many ways, whereby very different assumptions about the involved objects and relations come into play. See also ontology, realism, recognition, epistemology, constructivism, facts, situations, internal/external, totality, relations, simulation. B.Reality is an expression for the totality of what is opposed to the perception of subjects and not only imagined. In this sense, reality is what is independent of us; on the other hand, some authors regard their formability as proof of their existence. See also dependence, independence, possibility, necessity, actualism, realism, idealism, constructivism, present, simulation, aboutness, circularity, objects, things, order.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Reality - Dictionary of Arguments

I 81
Stimulus meaning: is objective reality, needed by the linguist - Translation, not identity but approach to stimulus meaning.
>Stimulus Meaning/Quine
.
XII 89
Reality/World/Russell/Quine: Russell's program was to present the outside world as a logical construct of sense data. Carnap's "construction" came closest to this.
Epistemology/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements and statements about the future are uncertain if they are understood to be about sense data or sensory impressions) is still unsolved today.
Carnap/Quine: his constructions would have made it possible to translate all sentences about the world into sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory.
>Sense Data/Quine.
XII 90
QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observation terms does not mean that it can be proven with logical and set-theoretical means from observation sentences.
>Observation Sentences/Quine
((s) Means of expression are not evidence. (> inside/outside, description levels, circularity).
Epistemology/Quine: N.B.: to want to endow the truths about nature with the full authority of immediate experience is just as doomed to failure as the return of the truths of mathematics to the potential insight of elementary logic. See also >Theory of >Cognition, >Empiricism.
VI 17
Theory/Reality/World/Quine: in philosophical theory we set demarcation lines where no really sharp boundaries can be drawn in practice.
It still depends on whether a theory such as "All ravens are black" would actually be refuted by a white raven, that depends on how we would decide in view of the vague stimulus meaning of the word.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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