Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Qualia, philosophy: qualia are the sensory-like correspondences to properties perceived on external objects or processes. Problems arise in connection with the explanation of their origin and their comparability between individuals. See also phenomena, sensory perception, sensations, perceptions, stimuli, qualities, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, objectivity, inverted spectra, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Stalnaker on Qualia - Dictionary of Arguments
I 222 Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: functionalism will explain qualia with a relational structure. >Functionalism. Problem: if we could have a permutation so that the relational general structure remained - then no functionalist theory could be right. >Inverted spectra, >Permutation. I 223 Vs: this can be disputed:the relations are more complex, for example, there are relations of colors among each other - that would mean denying symmetry. >Colour. Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: bad solution: a bad solution would be to introduce additional characteristics, e.g. blue is cool - we only need the possibility of symmetry for some creatures. >Symmetries. Functionalism: functionalism identifies qualia intra-personnally through distinguishability. Shoemaker: Shoemaker wants to reconcile interpersonal comparisons with qualia. >Sydney Shoemaker. Interpersonal/Wittgenstein: interpersonal arises from the possibility to change intra-personnally. Bad solution/swapped spectra: It is not a good solution to introduce additional characteristics like red is hot, blue is cool etc. >Metaphors. Stalnaker: I follow Shoemaker and put aside such objections. We need only the possibility of symmetry for some creatures. Qualia/Functionalism/Stalnaker: since functionalism identifies qualia intrapersonally via distinguishing capacities, one should expect it to accept the Frege/Schlick view, i.e., that there is no interpersonal counterpart to it. >Moritz Schlick. Shoemaker: That would be too simple. Thesis: Shoemaker wants to reconcile interpersonal comparisons of qualia with a functionalist approach. While we cannot define certain qualitative states in functionalist terms, we can define classes of qualitative states. Classes of qualitative states: We functionally define identity conditions for elements of this class, then we can define relations of phenomenal (qualitative) sameness and dissimilarity. >Identity conditions. Thus we obtain equivalence classes of physical states. Equivalent states will be those which are realizations of the same qualitative state. Then the qualitative states are identified with their physical realizations. >Equivalence classes. ShoemakerVsFrege/Stalnaker: the main reason he resists the Frege/Schlick view is... I 224 ...the view that one cannot deny the coherence of the hypothesis that there can be intrapersonally interchanged spectra. And he believes that from there there is an argument for interpersonal swapped spectra that cannot be resisted._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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