Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Propositions - Dictionary of Arguments

I 332
A sentence is a universal - Value of the variable: is the proposition (object) - remains in place even after a singular term! - Proposition resists change of the truth value. - Proposition remains nameless in x0p.
Words denote - sentences do not! (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular terms formed by bracketing of the sentence (no proposition!).
>Singular Term/Quine

I 343
Modal Logic: Church/Frege: a modal sentence is a proposition.
I 347
Proposition here: completion of correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? This denotes nothing.
I 355
Vs Propositions: translations must also mean propositions. - Actually right proposition cannot be explored by behavior (>Gavagai). - Proposition eliminated: synonymy is indefinable - scientific truth is indefinable (only within the theory) (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960, §16)(1).
I 358
Proposition: no common meaning of translated sentences: indeterminacy of translation - propositions could all be quite different.
>Translation/Quine
I 358
Proposition as bearers of truth: there is no reason why one should refer to timeless sentences and not to the sentences themselves.
Sentence: The door is open- bracketing: needed to find out what the sentence expresses in a situation. What could the speaker have said? (Propositions do not help there).


1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press

- - -
VII (f) 109
Propositions/Quine: if anything, they should be regarded as names of statements.
VII (h) 157
Proposition/Quine: in relation to sentences as attributes, in relation to open sentences - Proposition "The number of planets is > 7" - is unequal the proposition "9 > 7".
X 32
Proposition/Object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is here not even a variable over an object, and once scheme letter of sentences, but only variable - (No semantic ascent necessary).
- - -
XII 39
Sentence/proposition/propositional attitude/translation/ChurchVsQuine: if a sentence bears the meaning instead of the proposition, then there is a problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S translate into English: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent. - QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence. - Quine: I still do not accept linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitudes: too artificial.
>Propositional Attitudes/Quine

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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