Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Positivism, philosophy: modern positivism represents the demand to trace back statements with a claim to explanation to differences which can be ascertained in the objects of investigation. What is ascertainable is, in this case, relativized to a framework theory and its methods. This is intended to exclude foreign and non-verifiable statements. See also empiricism, internal/external, truth, provability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Jerry Fodor on Positivism - Dictionary of Arguments
II 122 Semantics/positivism: Fodor: positivism distinguishes two branches of semantics: a) theory of meaning, i.e. relations between linguistic units which are e.g. >Analyticity, >Synonymy, >Meaning. . b) theory of signification, i.e. relations between linguistic units and the reality, e.g. name, designating, truth, term scope. >Semantics, >Meaning theory, >Signs, >Designation, >Scope, >Term scope, >Proper names, >Truth._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
||
> Counter arguments against Fodor
> Counter arguments in relation to Positivism
