Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Phenomenalism: is the notion that it is the manner of experience of the objects, and not the objects in themselves to which we can refer. In this case, the existence of the corresponding objects is not assumed in principle for all sensory impressions. See also empiricism, perception, sensory perception, sensory impressions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gilbert Ryle on Phenomenalism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 322 ff PhenomenalismVsSubstance, Vs "higher unity" in the object -> sense-data theory. I 321ff We do not have a "pure" vocabulary of sensations. We can indicate our sensations only by mentioning ordinary objects, including people. I 322 A goalpost is permanent, while sensations are fleeting. It is a unity, while sensations are a multiplicity, so there is a tendency to say that "behind" the sensations there is a higher unity of the goalpost; important features, namely, that it is a continuing substance, a thing in itself a source of causality, an objective unity... Phenomenalism/Ryle: tries to get along without these useless secret means of theory but does not recognize the disease. RyleVsPhenomenalism: it springs from another, less laudable motive: he assumed that having a sensation is itself a determining of something, or that something is "revealed" in the sensation. >Sense data theory. It seemed to follow that we can't really observe things and therefore can't find out by observation those things that we know very well about goalposts. I 323 RyleVsPhenomenalism: The truth is that "sense objects" is a meaningless expression, so the expression "statement about sense objects" is also meaningless. >Inner objects, >Mental objects, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought, >Mentalism. RyleVsPhenomenalism: it is false to see sensation as something to explore (Vs "sense objects"). "Indirect monitoring": sensation is not describable without reference to objects._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
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