Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
| |||
Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
Ludwig Wittgenstein on Ontology - Dictionary of Arguments
Hintikka I 73 Ontology/Possible Worlds/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: the objects remain the same - no matter how different a world is in relation to our actual world. ((s) See also the distinction S4/S5; see systems. I 172 Ontology/Tractatus/VsWittgenstein/Hintikka; contains no functions as basic concepts. - Hintikka: because of Wittgenstein's interpretation of identity. See Identity/Wittgenstein, Functions/Wittgenstein, >Objects, >Identity, >Concepts, >Possible Worlds. I 30 Grammar/Hintikka: in a logically analyzed language, the grammar corresponds to ontology. >Grammar. I 73 et seqq. Existence/Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: unlike Frege, Wittgenstein envisages an ontology of possible facts in the Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, it makes little sense to talk about a possible existence. This means that we have to understand the actual objects as if everyone existed with necessity. Necessity/Wittgenstein. I 123 Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein's basic ontology is the same as the one by Frege. As far as the connectives are concerned, there is complete agreement. That Wittgenstein invented the truth functions is often falsely claimed. I 124 Heijenoort/Hintikka: proves the truth functions of Frege as implicit. The sentence is the expression of his truth conditions. Because of his thesis of the inexpressibility of semantics, he does not establish a theory of truth functions. Ontology/Negation/Hintikka: ...this means that the negation is ultimately eliminated from the ontology and semantics of the Tractatus. I 172 Ontology/Tractatus/VsWittgenstein/Hintikka: another objection is that Wittgenstein's Tractatus ontology contains no functions among the undefined elements (in contrast to properties and relationships). Hintikka: the reason is probably his interpretation of the identity in the Tractatus, which makes it difficult to identify functions in the usual way as relations whose last relation is clearly determined by the choice of the other values. - - - III 142 Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: must consist of an absolute determination of what is conceivable and possible. - - - VI 63 Tractatus/Schulte: no systematic representation of an ontology, or treatise on logical syntax._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |