Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

John R. Searle on Ontology - Dictionary of Arguments

I 33
In epistemological terms, it is laudable to say that the whole of reality is objective, neurobiologically it is simply wrong.
I 40
Ontology/Searle: wrong question: what kinds of things are there in the world? Correct: what must be the case that our empiricism is true? >Empiricism/Searle, >Existence/Searle.
I 78f
Reducibility is in any case a strange requirement of ontology, because in the past it was considered a classical proof of the non-existence of an entity if one traced it back to something else.
>Reduction, >Reductionism.
I 118
The ontology of observation, in contrast to its epistemology, is precisely the ontology of subjectivity.
I 182
The ontology of unconscious states of mind consists solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena.
I 183
This seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, and yet these states have an aspect shape! This contradiction dissolves when we consider the following:
The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state that is a possible conscious thought.
The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts.
>Object of thought, >Object of belief, >Intensional object.
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II 68
Representation: there is no ontology tied to representation.
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V 163
Ontology: main question: are there criteria for ontological prerequisites?
V 164
Existence/Quine: to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable.
Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and meaningless.
Alternative criterion: a theory presupposes and only the entities that it says exist. (This does not have to be done explicitly.)
V 165
Ontology/Searle: one notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not be derived from it.
It is also possible that there is no translation procedure to determine which statement is the simpler or better one.
SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion, two statements that actually include the same prerequisites would include different prerequisites! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine).
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Stalnaker I 181
Ontology/language/metaphysics/Searle: one may not draw ontological conclusions from linguistic theories.
>Identification principle.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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