Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Object language, philosophy: The object language is the language in which something is said or written in a situation. In contrast, comments and evaluations of what is said or written are invariably written in a metalanguage when the original utterance is mentioned or quoted in it. Metalanguage is thus language about language. Object language is used to mention objects, metalanguage is used to mention linguistic ways of expression. See also metalanguage, mention, use, quotation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Hartry Field on Object Language - Dictionary of Arguments
I 100 Object language/metalanguage/Field: E.g. proof theory: here there is no object level. >Proof theory. Object level: here the statements do not refer to propositions or formulas - and thus not to axioms, rules of inference or derivatives. >Statements, >Propositions, >Axioms. Proof Theory: works with mathematical entities. >Mathematical entities. II 142 Axiom/(s): not part of the object language. Schematic formula: can be part of the object language. Field: this detects the concept of truth better. >Truth, >Metalanguage._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |