Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Objectivity: is a property of determinations about facts. It is assumed that the properties attributed to the facts are determined by the facts and are not, or as little as, influenced by the attributing person. In order to determine whether this requirement is fulfilled, consideration must be given to the methods of access to information. This goes beyond the facts considered._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Gottlob Frege on Objectivity - Dictionary of Arguments
I 59 Objectivity/Frege: objectivity is independent of our perception, imagination, etc. but not of our reason. Otherwise it would be like trying to judge without judging. >Judgment, >Reason, >Imagination, >Subjectivity. - - - Graeser I 35f Def Objectivity/reality/Frege/Graeser: ... this fixed is called objective by Frege and distinguishes it from what is real. Truth/GraeserVsFrege: Problem: circularity: Frege now comes in a position to say that the laws of being true are themselves true, and to explain what makes them true. >Reality._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |