Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Negation, philosophy, logic: negation of a sentence. In logic, this is done by prefixing the negation symbol. Colloquially expressed by the word "not", which can be at different positions in the sentence. If the negation refers only to one sentence part, this must be made clear by the position, e.g. a predicate can be denied without negating the whole sentence. In logic, therefore, inner and outer negation is distinguished by the use of different symbols.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Gottlob Frege on Negation - Dictionary of Arguments

Chisholm II 181 ff
Negation/Frege/Simons: negative facts pose a problem here. Solution: we simply take two truth values ​​(true/false) and a function that swaps the two.
WittgensteinVsFrege: a connection should not be represented as a function. Operator N: forms a conjugate's negation from a sentence: the asserted (the used variables) are false.
Notation: x^: all values ​​of x.
Negation/Simons: negation only has the smallest range: atomic sentences.
Operator N: always negates the disjunction, never the conjunction, because of Wittgenstein’s need for atoms. Ontology: only complexes and the verbs E! and N.
- - -
Frege IV 61
Negation/denial/judgment/FregeVsKant: Kant speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. That is quite unnecessary. Even a negative judgment is a simple judgment.
>Judgment
, >Sentence, >Thought.
IV 64
Negation/denial/Frege: negation is not equal to the judgments. It is not an "opposite pole" to the judgments.
IV 69
Description/subordinate clause/name/Frege: E.g. "The negation of the notion that 3 is greater than 5" - this expression refers to a specific individual thing. This individual thing is a notion. The definite article turns the entire expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name.
IV passim
Thought/Frege: to every idea belongs its negation as an independent second idea. Thoughts are not made up, but grasped. Their truth is not their being thought. They are timeless, precisely because they must always carry a determination of time with them. Thus, "today" becomes "yesterday" and "I" become "He" (two thoughts). By replacing "horse" with "mare" the thought does not change, only the coloring.
- - -
Tugendhat II 66f
Negation/Frege: negation is not a property and does not always come with the sign of negation. E.g. "Christ is immortal" is not negative per se. The negation sign applies only to the propositional content.
Proof: negation in sub clauses: only the whole sentence is asserted. In the clause (non-asserting) the "not" belongs to the propositional content from the outset.
Tugendhat II 12
Proposition/Frege/Tugendhat: negation always refers to the propositional content, not to the assertion.
>Proposition, >Propositional content.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992


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