|Laws of Nature, philosophy: laws of nature (physical laws) are descriptions of dependencies of physical quantities among each other. From the fact that these are descriptions, it follows that these are no regulations in the sense of e.g. legal regulations. N. Goodman suggests in “Fact, Fiction and Forecast” (1954) that natural laws should be formulated in the form of irreal conditional sentences (also known as counterfactual conditionals); If A were the case, B would have been the case. See also counterfactual conditionals, irreal conditionals, laws, lawlikeness, law statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Nancy Cartwright on Natural Laws - Dictionary of Arguments
Natural Laws/Truth// Cartwright: thesis: the truly explanatory (theoretical) laws of physics do not tell us the truth.
Laws of nature / Cartwright: two ways: a) Association / Hume: e.g. the equations of physics: whenever force acts on an object, the acceleration f / m - b) causal laws: E.g. Smoking causes cancer.
Hacking I 56
Laws of nature / Nancy Cartwright: deceptive, only phenomenological laws > possibility of truth - but it is possible that we know about causally effective communication. - I 70 laws do not reflect facts and do not evoke anything. - ((s) > Ryle). CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are features of the processes by which we theorize - per Entity -Realism VsTheory-Realism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996